THE NAZI GENOCIDE OF THE ROMA
Reassessment and Commemoration

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After seventy years since the end of World War II the fate of the Romani population in Nazi-occupied Ukraine still remains a blank spot. At the discursive level, scholars have been debating whether the Nazi mass murder of the Roma amounted to genocide. Specifically, historians have posed the question if the mass murder was premeditated and if it involved the administration at all levels.

In the case of the occupied Soviet territories, this debate is complicated by the fact that the guiding principles used by the Nazis in their treatment of the Roma differed markedly from those applied in Germany proper. Due to the input of the German administration at a lower level, the uniform policy vis-à-vis the Roma as such did not exist. The existing practices to a larger degree depended on the predominance of any one occupational authority: the civil administration, the SS, or the Wehrmacht. When it came to deciding over the life and death of individual Roma, the criteria were by no means drawn directly from “racial” concepts worked out at Robert Ritter’s Research Institute for Racial Hygiene and Population Biology but rather were justified on the basis of their social status.

The “Gypsy policymaking” in Nazi-occupied Ukraine involved several German agencies, each one pursuing its own interests. The Einsatzgruppen C and D of the German Security Police played by far the most significant role in the process of destruction, followed by the Office of the Higher SS and Police Commander (Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer, or HSSPF), the Wehrmacht, field gendarmerie, and the civil administration of Reich Commissariat Ukraine (Reichskommissariat Ukraine, or RKU). The inconsistency of initiatives at various levels further complicated the picture, occasionally rendering the Nazi policy toward the Roma in Ukraine self-contradictory.

This chapter attempts to explicate this contradiction by addressing the following issues. First, in the absence of a comprehensive overview, I will provide a basic outline, on a province-to-province basis, of the major aspects of the Nazi campaign of extermination vis-à-vis the Roma in Ukraine. Second, I will speculate whether different branches of the Nazi occupation authorities—the military, the SS, and the civil administration—treated the Romani minority differently. Third, taking into account that some parts of the present-day Ukraine were administered by Germany’s satellites, Romania and Hungary, I will look for potential differences, if any, in the persecution of the Roma in different occupation zones. Fourth, I will consider the attitudes of the local non-Romani population toward the Nazi mass murder of Roma and the effect that they might have had on the extermination policy. As an overall objective, this chapter will assess the current state of research on this particular subject and pinpoint the specific aspects that warrant further investigation.

The “Gypsy Question” as Perceived by the Wehrmacht, the SS, and the Civil Administration

During the Einsatzgruppen Trial at Nuremberg in 1947-48, the former commander of Einsatzgruppe D Otto Ohlendorf had testified that, in May or June 1941, head of the German Police and the SS Heinrich Himmler and head of the Reich Security Main Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt, or RSHA) Reinhard Heydrich had communicated verbal orders (through intermediaries) “to protect the rear of the troops by killing the Jews, Gypsies, Communist functionaries, active communists, and all other persons who could endanger the security.” On the basis of this testimony some historians have concluded that the task of killing the Roma had been assigned to the Einsatzgruppen before Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union. Other scholars, however, consider
Ohlendorf’s statement as unreliable and question the existence of any direct order regarding Roma. In his testimony Ohlendorf did not refer to any higher orders or other “rational” justifications to explain the elimination of the Romani population. While denying the distinction between Roma and Jews had ever been made, he ascertained the latter group’s alleged proclivity for espionage. If a specific directive concerning the Roma had been issued, Ohlendorf would have likely mentioned it. Otherwise, Ohlendorf ascribed “asocial” characteristics to all Roma without exception and insisted that the reasons for the destruction of the two groups were identical.

Heydrich’s written orders did not specifically mention the Roma. Among groups and individuals who were subject to “special treatment,” Heydrich’s deputy Heinrich Müller listed five categories: parthians, communists, Jews, the mentally ill, and “other elements dangerous to the state.” Nevertheless, Einsatzgruppen units (so-called Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos) had the right “to take executive measures concerning the civilian population within the scope of their missions, upon their own responsibility.” In effect, the commander of a unit could, at his discretion, identify groups that “posed a threat” to the Wehrmacht. When identifying the array of “political opponents” of the regime, the Einsatzgruppen leaders were guided by the demands of the moment and the local situation. In addition to the shortage of food supplies and billeting space, the Soviet partisan threat was another essential factor in decision making. Under these circumstances, the decision to include the Roma—whom Nazi ideology and propaganda had declared inferior—among the groups to be exterminated seemed entirely logical to the local occupation administration. Contributing their own, negative, stereotypes of Roma, the army officers’ frequent references to the potential for Romani “espionage” demonstrate just how widely the Wehrmacht’s position influenced the decision to liquidate the Roma in the occupied Soviet territories and elsewhere. For example, in spring 1940 three thousand Roma were deported to the General Government of Poland from the western areas of Germany as a result of direct pressure from the Wehrmacht High Command, which wanted to rid the area of potential spies while the war with France was in progress. Similarly, German army officers saw executions of Roma in Serbia in fall 1941 not as part of a general plan to wipe out Roma, but as part of a reprisal campaign and as a response to suspected espionage.

Fairly often, the German occupation administration discriminated between the itinerant and sedentary Roma, between the “asocial” and “socially stable.” This approach was typical of the Reich Commissioner for the Ostland (Reichskommissariat Ostland, or RKO) Heinrich Lohse.

In the fall of 1941 Lohse directed Himmler’s attention to the problem created in the RKO by itinerant Roma as the group supposedly unfit for labor and responsible for spreading diseases. On 4 December 1941, he issued a decree that presented the Roma as a double threat. Arguing that Roma caused harm to the Germans by sharing information with the enemy, Lohse concluded that “they need to be treated in the same manner as the Jews.”

The criteria for exercising “Gypsy policy” were a subject of discussion at the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories (Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, or RMO) in Berlin in June 1942. When developing a uniform policy regarding the Roma in the East, RMO official Otto Bräutigam inquired about the status of the Roma in the RKO: “I am particularly interested in whether Gypsies, in your opinion, should be subjected to the same treatment as the Jews. Also, I need information on the Gypsies’ lifestyle, whether they are settled or nomadic, what their activities are, and how many mixed Roma are found in their midst.” According to Guenter Lewy, the RKO received the same inquiry.

There is circumstantial evidence that, following that inquiry, the RKO authorities were indeed collecting the data on the Romani population. On 10 July 1942, the rural district administration of Vysotak in Volyn forwarded to village councils the order issued by county authorities requesting the latter to submit within five days the information about the Roma residing within their administrative borders. The inquiry contained ten questions, including the following: “How long a Gypsy lives in a village?”; “Occupation/profession?”, “Does he/she own land?”; and “Is he/she a real Gypsy or mixed blood?” Nine village councils reported no Roma residing on their territory. It is unlikely that the data collection campaign had been launched on the initiative of any particular county administration. Remarkably, the questions posed in the inquiry were essentially identical to those in Otto Bräutigam’s letter. This observation indicates that, most probably, similar inquiries originating from the same source had been distributed across the RKO.

The official response from the RKO issued on 2 July 1942 cited Lohse’s decree of 4 December 1941 as the basis for “Gypsy policy” and stated that the remaining Roma were a threat to the region. In July of the same year the RMO prepared a draft order, the Treatment of the Gypsies in the Occupied Eastern Territories, which prescribed: “No distinction is to be made between settled and nomadic Gypsies. Gypsies of mixed race are as a rule to be treated as Jews, particularly when they live in a Gypsy fashion or are not socially integrated.” The order stipulated the following criteria to be used in determining Roma identity:
self-identification, testimonies of other group members, lifestyle, and social conditions. According to the historian Michael Zimmermann, the deliberate ambiguity of these criteria reflected the willingness of the civil administration to eventually get rid of all Roma in the area of their control. 

For reasons unknown, the drafting of this order continued until May 1943. The next version, however, suggested a different solution to the Gypsy Question by taking into account the difference between the itinerant and the sedentary groups, who would be placed in special camps. This time around, Roma were to be treated differently from the Jews, with no difference made between Roma of mixed origin (Zigeunerminschlange) and so-called pureblooded Roma. The definition of “Roma” was entrusted to Reich commissioners while the actual execution of the order was delegated to the German Security Police and the SD. The historian Guenter Lewy has attributed the change in the treatment of the Roma to the fact that the RMO and its leader Alfred Rosenberg had acted in the vein of the Roma policy in Germany proper as implemented by Himmler. In accordance with that policy, a part of Germany’s Roma regarded as itinerant “and socially dangerous” was deported to Auschwitz, whereas the sedentary Roma, deemed useful, were to be dispatched to forced labor camps.  

On 19 October 1943, the leader of the German Security Police and SD in the RKO Friedrich Panziger let Lohse know that the Reich Criminal Police Office had notified the former of Himmler’s plans concerning the Roma. Sedentary and mixed-blood Roma were subject to the same treatment as the rest of the population in the occupied territories. Itinerant Roma and half-blood persons meanwhile were assigned the same status as the Jews, to be confined to concentration camps. These principles were reiterated in the RMO decree of 15 November 1943 (sent to both RKO and RKU), and the corresponding order by Lohse. According to Lewy, this decree introduced no changes in the existing situation; it effectively legalized the policy that had since long been introduced in RKO: the itinerant Roma were shot on the spot whereas the sedentary Roma still had a chance for survival. Conspicuously, no specific documents pertaining to the discussion regarding the treatment of the Roma in Reich Commissariat Ukraine have come to light until now; the policy making can only be explored at the level of civil administration in few areas.

According to the Soviet census of 1939, out of the 88,242 Roma in the whole of the country 10,443 lived in Ukraine (0.03 percent of the total population of the Ukrainian SSR). Taking into account the 2,064 Roma in Crimea and a few more thousands in the former Polish and Romanian territories incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939–40—according to the historian Alexander Kruglov—the total Romani population in Ukraine (excluding Transcarpathia, which was part of Hungary between 1939 and 1944) hardly exceeded 20,000 persons by mid-1941. However, since a part of the Roma people led an itinerant lifestyle while some Roma identified themselves as Ukrainians or Russians (and thus distorted the census data), the actual figure might be much larger.

As previously stated, due to the absence of uniform guidelines from the German Security Police and owing to local context, Nazi anti-Gypsy policies differed from one region of occupied Ukraine to another. Since the territory of what is now Ukraine was divided into several occupation zones dominated by different type of authority (military administration in left-bank Ukraine, civil administration in RKU, Romanian administration in Transnistria and West Galicia), I chose to examine the Nazi mass murder of the Roma within each of the provinces (oblasts) of contemporary Ukraine separately. Unfortunately, most of the available evidence is mere statistics, and even then, incomplete. The names of the victims often remain unknown and so are the names of the perpetrators of brutalities. The objective of the following, rather sketchy, overview is to convey the scope of the Nazi Final Solution of the Gypsy Question, as it was carried out in Ukraine.

The Mass Murder of Roma Under Military Rule

The larger part of the territory of Ukraine east of the Dniester River (currently Chernihivska, Donetska, Luganska, Kharkivska, and Sumskas provinces) remained for the duration of the German occupation under the jurisdiction of the Wehrmacht. Divided into several Army Rear Areas (Rückwartiges Armeegebiet), this part of contemporary Ukraine was administered through the local and field commandant’s offices (Ortskommandaturen and Feldkommandaturen). The latter agency had not only military but also political functions, carrying out so-called pacification measures in cooperation with the SS Einsatzgruppen.

On 13 September 1941, on its way from Vyrvia to Dererv in Chernihiv province, Sonderkommando 4a shot dead the thirty-two members of a Romani caravan on the pretext that German ammunition had allegedly been found in a horse cart. According to a situational report (Ereignismeldung) of Einsatzgruppe C: “As the mob had no documents, and could not explain the origin of these items, it was executed [en masse].” On 30 May 1942, in pursuance of the order by district gendarmerie, sedentary Roma working at “Stallin” collective farm were arrested and taken to the village of Buturin where eleven of them were executed. Three
other Romani agricultural workers, two men and a woman from the village of Riazukh in Dmytrivskyi district, were shot dead in the town of Bakhmach on 24 October 1942.  

One of the best documented executions of Romani population took place in the city of Chernihiv. On 10 July 1942, the local security police chief issued an announcement (in Ukrainian and Russian) that required the Roma to assemble “for resettlement to new places of residence.” To avoid a “severe punishment” promised in the case of a failure to obey this order, the Roma flocked to Chernihiv from the surrounding towns, villages, and hamlets. The police told the Roma that they were about to be resettled in Serbia and therefore should take their money and valuables along with them. In August 1942, the Roma who had gathered in the city were taken to a local jail. According to witness testimonies, the half-naked and barefoot Roma were kept twenty-five persons per cell. On 30 September they were taken in groups to a nearby forest where they were executed. According to various estimates, the number of victims ranged from few hundred to two thousand. 

Following the destruction of a larger part of the Romani population, the German Security Police continued hunting down individual survivors. On 20 December 1942, four Romani persons, among them three children, were brought to Chernihiv for execution from the village of Tykhoniv. Fourteen individuals were arrested in the town of Kovshyn; they, too, were executed in Chernihiv later in 1943. Seven Roma from the village of Zhuravky, Varvynskyi district, faced a firing squad in Pryluky on 25 September 1942. 

Along with the official documents, oral testimonies provide further details of the Nazi genocidal policies. In the summer of 1942, not far from Chernihiv a police patrol spotted a Romani caravan whose members were celebrating a wedding. The policemen ordered the Roma men to dig their own grave but took the newlyweds to the city. In Chernihiv, the newlyweds reportedly had their cheeks pierced through with a metallic rod, put the screws on both ends, and then forced to march on a leash around the city for some time. Eventually, all the eighteen families from this particular caravan were murdered. The massacres continued in 1943. According to the data of the Soviet State Extraordinary Commission for the Investigation of the Crimes Committed by German Fascists and their Collaborators on the Territory of the USSR (Чрезвычайная государственная комиссия, or ChGK), 387 persons were murdered on 6 January 1943, in Novgorod-Siverskyi; 40 persons were executed on 26 February 1943, in Gorbov; smaller groups of Roma were put to death between May 1942 and March 1943 throughout the Chernihiv province.

The massacre that took place in March 1943 in the village of Gorodishe of Baturin district demonstrates most clearly the Nazis’ intention to murder all the Roma irrespective of their social status and lifestyle as a security threat to the army. The Germans rounded up (on the pretext of an imminent resettlement) and subsequently executed some twenty Roma from Gorodishe and neighboring villages along with the other inhabitants regarded as Communist Party members and Soviet activists—a total of fifty-six persons. According to a Romani survivor, “Our ancestors got patches of land over here in 1861. Many of the Roma got married to the Ukrainians so that one could not really claim we were the true Gypsies, it’s just that we looked like Gypsies. But the Germans disliked the Gypsies, saying the Gypsies were all untrustworthy people and that they were [Soviet] partisans.” The German occupation authorities used the same rationale for the mass murder of the Roma in other provinces of Ukraine.

According to ChGK records, the Romani population of Artemivsk in Donetsk province was exterminated following the destruction of the Jews in that city in late February 1942. Carried out by Sonderkommando 4b, the mass execution took place in a former alabaster mine and claimed the lives of at least twenty Roma, that is, the entire community. The hunt for survivors as well as the Roma from mixed marriages continued for several months after the mass execution. Ivan Koriatkin, who was married to a Ukrainian and had six children, for example, was arrested on 13 April 1942. The Donetsk (until 1961 Stalino) province ChGK had concluded that the Romani population of the city of Mariupol was subjected by the Nazis to the same treatment as the Jews, who were executed en masse in October 1941. Sonderkommando 10a murdered the total of forty Roma. Another Einsatzgruppe unit carried out a similar mass execution in the city of Kharkiv, in a forest park and the Drobytskyi ravine respectively. Most Roma were rounded up in the horse market in Kharkiv and in the Ordzhonikidze neighborhood. The town of Balakleva in Kharkiv province became a site of an execution of approximately fifty Roma.

Up to thirty Roma were executed in the city of Sumy in mid-1942. Another, larger, mass execution in Sumy province took place in the town of Leninsk on 9 and 10 January 1943. Two days earlier, local policemen arrested members of the Prokota, Moskalenko, and Pinchuk families (thirty-one of them identified by name) and fifteen other Roma. According to ChGK data, between October 1941 and February 1942 the German Security Police units carried out mass executions of Roma in at least six localities in Zaporizhia province: forty-eight persons were murdered in Mykhailivka and sixty in Pryluky; Reichskommando 31 of
Einsatzgruppe Halbstadt executed eighty-one persons in Molochansk; Einsatzkommando 12, seventeen in Guliaipole; Sonderkommando 10a, about one hundred in Molotopol; and Einsatzkommando 12, three hundred in Polocy.35

The Mass Murder of Roma in Civil Administration Zone

The Reich Commissariat Ukraine with the official capital in Rivne came into existence on 1 September 1941 and remained administratively under the RBO. As of 1 September 1942, RKU comprised six general districts (Generalbezirke) that constitute contemporary Volyn, Rivne, Zhytomyr, Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, and partially Mykolaiiv, Vinnytia, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia provinces, as well as Crimea and a small portion of left-bank Ukraine incorporating parts of Kiev and Poltava provinces. As the Wehrmacht advanced eastward, the military authorities transferred power in these areas to the RMO. The latter put RKU in charge of economic matters, while the security-related tasks remained within the jurisdiction of the German Security Police and SD and the Office of Higher SS and Police Commander in South Russia (Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer).

Members of Einsatzgruppe D, moving eastward in the rear of the Eleventh Army, carried out earlier mass executions of Roma in Mykolaiiv province: in September 1941 they murdered between 100 and 150 Roma, among them women and children; the number of victims of the October massacre remains unknown.36 A further two hundred Roma were shot in the city of Mykolaiiv in January 1942.37 A total of 120 Romani and Jewish families were killed in the former German colony of Steinberg, Varvarivskyi district, where they had been previously used as slave laborers.

The Red Army political division reported on 26 April 1942 that seven thousand Jews along with the twenty-eight Romani families were executed by the Germans in Kherson shortly after the city had been occupied.38 Apparently, the local ChGK reported on the same event when it stated that seventy Romani women and children had been killed in Kherson in March 1942. According to one other source, in May of 1942 the Roma were ordered to assemble for deportation “to their motherland,” that is, to Romania. After some three hundred Roma had gathered, they were executed en masse near the city jail, and their bodies were dumped into the ditch.39 Fifty more Roma were put to death in the summer of 1943.40 Another case of mass murder, which destroyed a caravan of 150, apparently was perpetrated at a local dumping ground for dead animals.41

The acts of mass murder also took place in Kherson suburbs. Thus, the ChGK had reported on the mass execution of twenty-six Roma (two men, twelve women, and twelve children) in Syvashi on 6 May 1942. Locked in a barn, initially the victims were told that they would be sent to Bessarabia. The names remain unknown of the fourteen persons who were murdered on 15 May in Pavlivka, not far from Syvashi. According to eyewitness accounts, the execution was carried out by the same SS commando as in Syvashi, and the Roma were similarly told of an impending resettlement. A group of eighteen Roma was arrested in the village of Bekhtera, Gola Prystan district, on 13 May 1942, taken by a truck to a nearby execution site, and shot. Just as brutally murdered were the sixteen Roma in Beryslav and, on 10 August 1942, a group of Roma in Starosoldatsk.42

The ethnographer Nikolai Bessonov has reconstructed the story of destruction by a German unit of a caravan near the city of Nikolop in Dnipropetrovsk province. The Germans drove a column of Romani horse carts to an antitank ditch. Once the victims realized their imminent fate, one of the Roma turned his wagon around and dashed across the field. The Germans had to abort the pursuit as their vehicles could not run through the ploughed field. This particular individual was thus able to escape, but the remaining Roma were shot.43 In Pokrovskyi district, in late 1942 gendarmerie and the Ukrainian auxiliary police conducted a raid, arresting and killing forty Roma.

The first documented mass execution of Roma—portrayed as “asocial elements (Gypsies)” —in Kirovograd province took place in early September 1941 and was carried out by Einsatzgruppe C.44 According to Kruglov, the systematic destruction of the Roma began in this part of Ukraine in 1942 when seventy-three persons were shot dead at “Lenin” collective farm in Novoukraiinski district. Another twenty-seven Romani farmers were murdered in the summer of 1942 in the village of Yanichi in Chygyryn district.44 In the town of Kirovograd, as established by the Ukrainian NKVD (Soviet Security Police) investigation commission, over six thousand Jews and one thousand Roma were “shot and tortured to death.”45

In the fall of 1941, during an operation against “undesired elements” in the city of Poltava, the police arrested and later executed a group of Roma. Following a similar roundup in Chutovo, the arrested Roma were murdered on the outskirts of the village and their bodies dumped in the ditch. Twenty-five Romani and Jewish families, 163 persons in total, were executed on 18 May 1942, in Pyristyn. In the town of Zinkiv an entire caravan of sixty-one men, women, and children was destroyed in 1942. With the exact date of the mass execution remaining unknown, survivors had testified that, when the executioners filled the grave up
with the soil, some of the victims were still alive. Twenty-five Roma were slaughtered in February 1943 in Kobeliaky and another 250 in April 1943 in Lubny.47 When shepherding horses sometime in 1943, a school student in Vishanka, Lubny district, witnessed the arrival of a few trucks loaded with Roma: “As usual, [the trucks] were trailed by a passenger car. A horrific carnage then commenced. The people screamed, tore their hair, tried to hide under the vehicles.... Then we went to the grave; the place was soaked with blood, with playing cards, dresses, necklaces scattered all around.”

In Bilozirka, Cherkasy district, not far from the town of Smila, a gravestone marks the site of a mass execution of 120 Roma who had been slain in the Tiasmyn marshes. In Zhytomyr province, according to ChGK records, the mass murder of Roma took place in June 1942 in Malyn and Yanushpol, with three hundred and sixty victims respectively. A Romani survivor testified that several members of a caravan had been murdered in 1941 not far from Novohrad-Volynsky. In the village of Golysh, Olevskyi district, German forces killed thirty-two Roma. According to one other, unconfirmed, testimony, twenty-six Roma were arrested by the Germans in Zhytomyr province and deported to the Krakow-Plaszów concentration camp. Romani children had later been transferred from Plaszów to Litzmannstadt (Łódź)—and reportedly did return home in 1945—whereas the adults had been deported farther to Germany and France.49

The first act of mass murder in Volyn province was committed on 2 June 1942, when German gendarmes executed sixty-four Roma in the village of Shylovoda.50 A similar mass execution took place the same month in Kamin-Kashyrskyi. On 17 August 1942, a German Security Police unit in Rivne reported that seventy-six Roma had been subjected to “special treatment” in Kamin-Kashyrskyi and Kovel.51 Prior to the mass execution, Jewish and Romani prisoners were locked in the same concentration camp; over one hundred Romani victims were hastily buried in a mass grave dug out in the Jewish cemetery by a local village. Approximately thirty Roma were put to death in January 1942 in Ratno; nearly fifty were slaughtered in the spring of 1943 near Zabolottia; and, according to witness accounts, no less than sixty were shot in 1943 in the village of Yderna, Kamin-Kashyrskyi district. The 150 Romani men, women, and children who had been arrested in Kovel were executed en masse after three days spent in a local concentration camp. The twenty Roma arrested in August of 1942 in Ternopil province had been dispatched to Kremenets prison where they were later executed.52

In Volodymyrets district of Rivne province, not far from the village of Stepangorod, the Germans hunted down and executed fifteen Roma who had been hiding in the forest.53 As reported by the Kostopol district commissar, on 21 April 1942, ninety-two Romani men, women, and children were arrested and dispatched to a forced labor camp in Ludvipol.54 In view of the fact that these “Gypsies were a serious burden to the camp due to severe lice infestation,” most likely they were eventually executed. On 15 May 1942, the commissar general of Brest-Lytovsk ordered “all nomadic Gypsies in the district to be arrested and imprisoned. For the time being, they need to be engaged in productive labor while their horses and wagons are to be confiscated.” On 21 May the commissar general of Volyn-Podillia instructed district commissars “to immediately arrest all wandering tradesmen, for they spread rumors.” He further prescribed to immediately arrest all itinerant Roma, to confiscate their horses and wagons, putting the latter to “rational use.”55 The ChGK has further documented the mass murder of some two hundred Roma in Sarny on 26 August 1942, and of another fifteen Roma “who had lived in the forest” in the village of Voronky in Volodymyrets district.56

Ill-known as the site of one of the largest massacres of Jews, Babi Yar—a ravine on the outskirts of Kiev—was also an execution site for the Roma. Anatoly Kuznetsov has written in his book, Babyn Yar: “Fascists hunted the Roma like game. They were subject to immediate destruction like the Jews.... The Roma were taken to Babi Yar by entire caravans, and it seems that until the very last moment they could not comprehend what was about to happen to them.”57 According to unverified data, back in September 1941 three Romani caravans from Kurenivka were executed on masse behind Kyrilivka Church.58 At least two testimonies mentioned a massacre of itinerant Roma, who arrived with their wagons, following the mass murder of Jews in late 1941–early 1942.59 Further testimonies spoke of the destruction of thirty Romani women and children at Babi Yar in 1942. The recurrent brutalities gave birth to a popular saying in Kiev during the war: “The Germans have come—good! The Jews are kaput. The Gypsies are dead too. And so will be the Ukrainians?” (Немць прийшли—добре! Євреям кінець. Циганам також, Українцям—поеся!) As of 1 April 1942, there only remained alive twenty Jews and forty Roma in Kiev. One year later, the Kiev Security Police Office had two Roma in its custody.60

In May 1942 the German Security Police dispatched the fifty-two extended Romani families from all over the Kiev district to the nearby town of Vasylov and executed them.61 According to ChGK records, in August 1942 near the town of Obukhiv the Ukrainian and German policemen arrested some 250 Roma. The policemen subsequently brought the Roma to the “The Ninth of January” collective farm where they executed the prisoners next to the silage pit. The executioners received the
order from Obukhiv gendarmerie chief [?] Fabisch and Obukhiv police chief Savka Zaists.\textsuperscript{62}

The Persecution of Roma in Transnistria

The southwestern part of prewar Ukraine, which contained a substantial number of Roma, was in 1941 occupied by Romania. Situated between the Dniester and Bug Rivers, the present Ukrainian provinces of Odessa, Mykolaiiv, and Vinnytsia constituted the so-called Transnistria Governorate. In addition, Transnistria included North Bukovina, currently the Chernivtsy province of Ukraine. As the factors contributing to the decision of the Antonescu regime to deport the Roma of Romania and Bessarabia to Transnistria have received considerable attention in scholarship,\textsuperscript{63} the following discussion will focus on the impact of these criminal policies on the Roma, both local residents and recent deportees.

In the Odessa province the mass murder of Roma commenced as early as August 1941. In the vicinity of Koshury village in the Andrei-Ivanivskyi district, a German squad ran across a Romani caravan comprising seventy people on eleven horse carts; the victims were subsequently executed at Mykolayivka.\textsuperscript{64} Along with the Jews, beginning in June 1942, Romanian occupation authorities carried out a deportation of the Romanian and Bessarabian Roma to Transnistria (deemed an “ethnic dump”). The deportation waves sent nearly twenty-five thousand persons across the Dniester River, close to 12 percent of the total Romani population of Romania. During the initial phase, in June-August 1942, only so-called nomadic Roma were subject to deportation. In September 1942, however, the deportation order extended also to those deemed “asocial.”\textsuperscript{65}

This is how Petre Radita has described his experiences of deportation: “We were transported from Bucharest in cattle cars, having only been allowed to take with us the carry-on luggage. We rode for a few weeks with frequent stops. The nights were cold, blankets were very scarce and so was the food. As a result, many people died of hunger and freezing temperatures before we had reached the Bug River in Ukraine. Placed in huts, the survivors were forced to dig trenches.”\textsuperscript{66} The Roma were dumped in the prefectures of Golta, Ochakiv, Berezivka, and Balta, even though itinerant Roma were originally destined for Golta prefecture and sedentary Roma for Ochakiv. Many Roma travelled to Transnistria with their own horses and wagons; by order of Transnistria governor Gheorghe Alexianu from 29 July 1942, all horses and wagons would be confiscated from their owners.

On 18 December 1942, Alexianu stipulated the status of a deportee. The Roma were ordered to live in villages in groups of 150 to 350. All persons from 12 to 60 years of age were obliged to perform paid labor; each village was to appoint a Romani elder who would ensure on a daily basis that the Roma did not leave their place of residence and/or evade their labor duties. All these provisions, however, only existed on paper. In reality, the deported had no food, clothes, medicines, or any other essentials. According to one witness: “The Roma, alongside the Jews, have arrived in Golta area. All their possessions were taken away and therefore they were dropping like flies.” A witness from the neighboring Akhmechetka village recalled that the Roma died of the same causes as the Jews, due to epidemic, starvation, and routine executions. The 3,423 surviving Roma in Kovalivka had been divided into four labor details in March 1943. The number of Roma in Golta, Kryve Ozero, Vradiyivka, Liubashivka, and Domanivka who had remained alive by November was 9,567. The Roma in Kovalivka were reportedly deprived of any means of existence, forced to sell their own clothes in order to survive. The winter of 1942–43 proved deadly for the Roma in Transnistria. For example, according to an official report, due to a typhus epidemic the number of Roma in Landau district had dropped from 7,500 to anywhere between 1,800 and 2,400.\textsuperscript{67} In an attempt to alleviate the situation, in the summer of 1943 the local authorities issued a decree disbanding labor details and prescribing to distribute the surviving Roma among the existing collective farms. This decree brought a partial relief to Roma’s plight, since it provided for an opportunity to procure food and get employment. At the same time, the local administration continuously blamed Roma for their poor work ethics, proclivity to theft, vagrancy, and unwillingness to settle in one place. The local population often viewed the Roma as a superfluous element, unwilling to share the limited resources with the former. Furthermore, the itinerant Roma occasionally died at the hands of Romanian gendarmes, SS-men, or local Volksdeutsche. As stated by the prosecution in Ion Antonescu’s court case, the prefect of the Golta district Modest Isopescu had ordered the execution of some six to eight thousand Roma. The auxiliary police units had executed an unidentified number of Roma, for instance, in the village of Schenfeld.\textsuperscript{68} Another massacre, of some twenty Roma, took place in the village of Velyka Mecheta in November 1943.\textsuperscript{69}

The deportation of Roma to Ukraine caused discontent on the part of the German officialdom. Writing to his boss, Alfred Rosenberg, in August 1942, Reich Commissioner for Ukraine Erich Koch argued that the Roma arriving to the eastern bank of the Bug “as before, constitute a threat and can exercise a bad influence on the Ukrainians.” Rosenberg
noted that the territory in which the Roma were originally meant to be deported had been settled by ethnic Germans, and petitioned before the German Foreign Office to influence Romania on this issue. The commission for the investigation of war crimes established in postwar Romania concluded: “Tens of thousands of innocent Roma were forced into Transnistria. Half of them had suffered from typhus. Gendarmes were treating them brutally: the life of each and every Roma was in danger and the tortures were bestial. Commanding staff resorted to obscenity and established entire harems consisting of good-looking Romani women. Approximately 36,000 Roma fell victim to the Antonescu’s regime.” According to estimates by Donald Kenrick and Grattan Puxon, around 20,000 “pureblooded” Roma and 4,000 Roma of mixed origin were deported eastward, and nearly as many itinerant Roma travelled to Transnistria in caravans. The death toll thus might be as high as 9,000. According to the Romanian historian Viorel Achim, however, out of the 25,000 Roma who had been deported to Transnistria only 14,000 survived.

The Persecution of Roma in Transcarpathia and the District Galizien

The two other, smaller, areas that warrant separate treatment are Transcarpathia (or Carpathian Ruthenia) and the District Galizien. In March 1939 Transcarpathia declared its independence as the Republic of Carpathian Ukraine, but was immediately invaded and annexed by Hungary. In the fall of 1944 the northern and eastern parts of Transcarpathia were seized by the Soviet Army, and eventually attached to Ukraine as Zakarpats’ka province. According to the 1930 census, the number of Roma in Transcarpathia amounted to 1,442, though the actual figure may be somewhat larger. Apparently, the so-called Gypsy Question became as acute in Transcarpathia in 1940-41 as it became elsewhere. Thus, the deputy chief of Uzhans district reported on 20 September 1940 to the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior that the local authorities had taken appropriate measures to prevent Roma migration, yet could not eradicate the root of the problem. On 16 April 1941, this question came up at a separate meeting in Uzhgorod, which proposed to the minister of the Interior to lock up all Roma in special camps and use them in river dyke construction works, lumber industry, tree planting, and other types of work. At this suggestion, the participants in the meeting referred to the example of the town of Szökefehérvár where a similar solution to the Gypsy Question had been implemented for the first time in Hungary.

Similar offers came from across Transcarpathia, effectively turning many caravan stopping grounds into ghettos. According to eyewitness accounts, the Roma were only able to live in the camp territory, surrounded by barbed wire and patrolled by guards, with a special permit. Worn out by grueling labor, severe malnutrition, and the lack of medical care, the Roma were dying slow death while awaiting deportation to Germany’s concentration camps. Following the resumption of hostilities in Transcarpathia on 15 July 1944, the German military command effectively sanctioned the previous practice by local authorities to isolate Roma in camps-cum-ghettos. The actual number of Roma who perished in Transcarpathia or those who were deported to their deaths to Hungary’s interior and/or German concentration camps remains unknown until today.

Very little is known today on the Nazi anti-Roma policies in District Galizien (currently Lviv, Ivano-Frankiv’sk, and Ternopil provinces of Ukraine), which was a part of the General Government of Poland between 1941 and 1944. Kruglov has argued that the persecution of the Roma in the District Galizien began no earlier than February 1942. This is when the district’s governor, acting pursuant to the decree issued by the General Government of Poland, prescribed to identify all Hungarian, Romanian, Slovakian, and other Roma. As a consequence, on 30 April 1942 the local welfare department reported to the General Government on the implemented “evacuation” of 536 foreign and 670 Polish Roma. Otherwise, the German treatment of the local Roma was fairly uniform. For example, in late June 1942 the gendarmerie shot twenty-five Roma in the town of Gorodok, Lviv province; a month later, the 1st company of the 133rd police battalion executed another twenty-four Roma in Rava-Ruska area. In Drohobych and Boryslav in August 1942, the Germans ordered the Roma to assemble at a local police station, subsequently deporting them to forced labor camps. During the liquidation of ghettos in 1943, the Roma were murdered along with the Jews across the towns and villages in District Galizien, for example, in Sambir in June 1943.

The Case Study of Crimea

The Crimean peninsula occupies a special place in the history of the persecution of the Roma in Ukraine, and therefore warrants closer examination. What makes this region so special is its multiethnic composition (besides Russians and Ukrainians, prior to the war the Crimea was home to the Crimean Tatars). Furthermore, despite the fact that the General District of Crimea was formally a part of RKU, the real power in the German-occupied Crimea belonged to the Wehrmacht. As I will
argue below, both these peculiarities influenced the Nazi treatment of the Crimean Roma.

According to the 1939 census, the Romani population of Crimea amounted to 2,064, of which 998 lived in cities and 1,066 in rural areas.\(^7\) However, it is likely that some Roma were put down as Crimean Tatars or remained unregistered altogether. A significant number of Roma had adopted Islam and acquired the language, traditions, customs, and names of the Tatars. Simferopol, Bakhchisarai, Karasubazar (Belogorsk), and Evpatoria counted among the Crimean cities with the largest Romani communities. The destruction of the Roma and Jews in Crimea began simultaneously, in November–December 1941.

Between mid-November 1941 and March 1942, Einsatzgruppe D reported to Berlin that it had shot a total of 2,316 Roma, saboteurs, mentally ill, and so-called asocial elements.\(^7\) These reports demonstrate that, in contrast to Jews, Roma for the most part were not singled out and put into a separate category of targeted victims. SS troops in the Crimea regarded them exclusively as asocial elements and saboteurs, regardless of their actual occupations, professional membership, or social status. Their ethnicity effectively spelled death to Crimean Roma.

According to a Romani survivor from Evpatoria, in early 1942 the German authorities compelled local Roma to report for registration. The Roma, however, went into hiding instead. In the ensuing raids the Germans apprehended more than one thousand people. The troops encircled the Romani quarters and loaded the inhabitants into trucks, with small children simply thrown into vehicles. The survivor described the execution scene at Krasnaia Gorka as follows: “I personally was in the second row of people assigned to be shot. The people in front of me were killed, and I was wounded in the shoulder. The fallen corpses covered me, so I just lay there wounded, and after the shots died down I climbed out from under the corpses and hid in the neighboring village.”\(^7\)

A Romani survivor from the village of Kamysy-Burun had told ChGK investigators that all Romani families in Kerch were imprisoned on 29 December 1941. According to him, the next day the guard detachment made up of Romanians put the Roma into twelve vehicles and took them to an antitank ditch outside of the city. The guards unloaded the people from the vehicles one by one and directed them to the ditch where German soldiers with submachine guns were waiting for them. Victims fell into the ditch after being hit by bullets from the German guns.\(^7\) According to the findings of the Dzhankoi ChGK, about two hundred Roma had been murdered in March 1942 in gas vans in northeastern Dzhankoi along the road to Chongar; their corpses were subsequently tossed in the ditch in several layers and then buried.\(^6\)

As of 1 November 1941, the Simferopol statistics office registered 1,700 Roma in the city. In two months’ time, the numbers went down to 1,100. At the beginning of January 1943, only eight Roma remained in the city.\(^8\) According to the recollections of eyewitnesses, the residents of Simferopol’s “Gypsytown” were rounded up on 9 December 1941—the same day that the Nazis gathered the city’s Krimchaks (a Turkic people practicing rabinic Judaism). At Nuremberg, Ohlendorf’s adjutant Helnz Hermann Schubert described the assembly of Roma as follows: “I went to the Gypsy quarter of Simferopol and supervised the loading of the people who were to be shot into a truck. I took care that the loading was completed as quickly as possible and that there were no disturbances or unrest on the part of the native population. Furthermore, I took care that the condemned persons were not beaten while the loading was going on.”\(^8\) Khrisanf Lashkevich described the same event differently in his diary: “The Gypsies came in crowds on carts and wagons to the Talmud-Torah [school] building. For some reason they raised a kind of green flag (the symbol of Islam) and they set a mullah at the head of their procession. The Gypsies tried to persuade the Germans that they were not Gypsies; a few identify themselves as Tatars, others as Turkmen. But their protests were ignored and they were moved into the big building.”\(^8\)

Nevertheless, according to eyewitness statements, many Roma were able to escape the massacres by fleeing the city. Some of them managed to survive by posing as Crimean Tatars. Significantly, the Crimean Tatar administration (so-called Muslim Committees were installed in each city and district center) sometimes protected the Romani minority, or at least those who practiced Islam. According to unconfirmed information, the persecution of the Roma in Simferopol stopped as a result of the intercession of the Muslim Committee with the German military command.\(^8\) Inasmuch as the committee was formed only at the end of December 1941 or the beginning of January 1942, however, only a few Roma could have benefited from its mediation. In any case, it was a small concession on the Germans’ part as they were hoping to win over the Crimean Tatars, and since much of the Romani population had already been destroyed by this time. At Nuremberg, Ohlendorf testified that the Solution of the Gypsy Question in Simferopol was indeed complicated by the fact that the Roma and the Crimean Tatars belonged to the same religion: “There were certain difficulties [in the identification of Roma], because some of the Gypsies—if not all of them—were Muslims. For this reason we considered it important not to damage relations with the Tatars, and therefore, [in seeking out and selecting Roma for extermination] we used people who understood the situation and the popula-
tion. Members of the Muslim Committee might have been involved in deciding which of the Roma were “essential” and which might be handed over to the Germans.

In any event, having destroyed most of the Roma in Simferopol in the first half of December 1941, the Germans apparently let the survivors be. The eyewitness Lashkevich confirmed this: “They did not manage to catch some of the Gypsies, and for reasons unknown to me, these were spared and were no longer persecuted.” The “Muslim factor” played an even larger role in Bakhchisarai whose Romani population remained unsacked, according to eyewitness testimonies. According to the Bakhchisarai Crimean Tatar oral tradition, when the Roma were assembled for “resettlement,” the Muslim Greek headman of the city (?) Fenerov “went up to the weeping crowd and asked [the German] officer to pick out three [Roma] at his discretion. This was done. Fenerov brought them to the headquarters and asked them to take off their pants in front of the Germans. Before the amazed Germans stood... Muslims! Fenerov then said that he could no longer be head of a city in which Muslims were being shot. The persecution was called off.” Whether this story is true or not, efforts to save the Roma were made not only by the municipal administration, but also by the Bakhchisarai Muslim Committee, which petitioned above all for the benefit of Roma who had gone to the same mosque as local Tatars, had spoken the same language, and had worked a trade or a retail business that benefitted the entire community.

In the rural areas of the Crimean peninsula, too, the destruction of the Jewish and Romani communities was carried out simultaneously in the first half of 1942. The identification and registration of the Romani population was initiated by the field commandant offices, which issued orders to the district headmen, who in turn passed them on to the village elders. Evidently, village elders and auxiliary police actively participated in registering and rounding up Roma. The physical destruction of the Roma was the responsibility of Einsatzgruppe D and the field gendarmerie. Significantly, in rural areas and the cities alike, the killing units made no distinction between sedentary and itinerant Roma, as the following case of the Buraliev family aptly demonstrates. The parents worked on a collective farm in Karagoz village in the Stary Krym district while their daughters went to school. According to an eyewitness, “In February 1942 a truck pulled up to the house where the Buralievs lived. Every member of the family was loaded onto the truck and taken to Stary Krym.... We never saw these people again, but the other villagers and I believe that they were all shot since, after the [German] troops arrived in the Crimea, the Germans killed Jews, Krimchaks, and Gypsies without mercy.” The seven members of the Asanov family were arrested in the Dzhuma-Eli village in the Stary Krym district and subsequently shot. On 15 January 1942, Petr Furesenko and his family of six from the village of Dzhai in the Biuk-Onlar district were executed “for being Gypsy.” In the Kolai district, thirty-two Roma were killed in the village of Terepli-Abash, six in Arlin-Barin, eight in Nem-Barin, two in Shirin, two in Mikhailova, twenty-five in the “Bolshevik” collective farm, two in Avlach village, and three in the “Eighth of March” collective farm.

As in the cities, the destruction of the Roma in the countryside was not total. Thus, the Evpatoria Field Commandant’s Office related on 9 July 1942 that, according to the information provided by the local headmen in the Evpatoria district, seventy-six Roma were still living among a total population of 91,910 people. The Einsatzgruppe D reported on 8 April 1942, that “with the exception of small groups still showing up in the northern Crimea, there no longer are any Jews, Krimchaks, or Gypsies on this territory.” According to a 15 June 1942 army report, however, out of a total civilian population of 573,428 in the Crimea, 405 were Roma. The last references to the extermination of the Roma date to mid-1942. This does not mean, however, that there were no longer any Roma on the peninsula after that time.

The fact that in the spring and summer of 1944 the Soviet authorities had deported Roma from the Crimea, together with Crimean Tatars, Armenians, Bulgarians, and Greeks, further confirms that a small part of the Romani population did survive the Nazi occupation. When reporting on the progress of the deportation, the NKVD did not treat the Roma as a separate category, apparently assuming that the remaining Roma were Tatars. Later, however, an MVD (Ministry of the Interior) report noted that alongside the “basic contingent” (основной контингент) who had been deported from the Crimea in 1944 were 1,109 Roma. In all likelihood, the surviving Crimean Roma belonged to the group closely related to the Crimean Tatars in their language and culture. Ironically, having been saved from Nazi persecution because of their connection to the Tatars, the Roma were subsequently persecuted by the Soviet power for the very same reason. All in all, possibly as many as one thousand Roma survived the Nazi occupation of the Crimea.

The Attitudes of the Local Population Toward the Persecution of Roma

At first glance, popular attitudes toward the persecution of the Roma appear to be of secondary importance when compared with the actual Ger-
man policies. However, the actions conceived and implemented by the occupation authorities did not exist in a vacuum. The Romani quarters were situated within the existing Russian or Ukrainian neighborhoods. Under conditions of German occupation, some individuals among the local population came to play an important role in civil administration, overseeing the implementation of various German orders and decrees, including those concerning the treatment of civilians. The attitudes of non-Roma, both as individuals and figures of authority, apparently had an impact, if only limited, on the genesis of the Nazi Final Solution of the Gypsy Question. The attitudes toward victims varied depending on local and regional context, the socioeconomic profile of the Romani community in any given region, popular images of “Gypsies,” and prewar interethnic relations. Without taking these factors into account, I argue, any attempt to both reconstruct and interpret the demise of the Romani minority in Ukraine during World War II would be incomplete.

So far, Nikolai Bessonov has been the first and only scholar who attempted not just to provide some examples of popular reactions toward the Nazi persecution of the Romani minority, but also to explicate those reactions. Thus, he has argued that the Slavic population extended support to the Romani minority, which was not at all the case with the Jews. Bessonov further stated that he “was unable to find even one case of support given by the locals to the occupiers.” He differentiated between political, economic, and cultural-psychological reasons as to the wide-scale aid given by the locals to the Romani: (1) Unlike Jews, Romani stayed outside politics and therefore were not responsible for the Soviet terror in the eyes of local population; (2) as horse-owners and skilled artisans, Romani maintained close contact with local farmers (for instance, in the winter season Romani families often rented a part of peasant’s house); (3) traditional activities of the Romani such as fortune-telling, singing, and dancing enjoyed steady popularity among the local population. In addition, the latter generally viewed the Romani as a group poorer than themselves.

However important, these observations mainly concern the relationship that had existed in rural areas, with a more complex admixture of social, professional, material, and cultural factors at play in urban centers. Indeed, the factors outlined by Bessonov apply almost exclusively to itinerant Romani, whereas sedentary, acculturated Romani were altogether well integrated into the existing social and professional structures. Furthermore, Bessonov based his analysis on popular reactions, essentially ignoring motivations and deeds of those among the local population who collaborated with the Germans. By the same token, Bessonov emphasized positive stereotypes of Romani, paying only scarce attention to plethora of negative anti-Roma stereotypes and prejudices.

As regards the social aspect of interethnic relations in wartime Ukraine, the two major forces that came under consideration are the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and, later, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), on the one hand, and the Soviet partisan movement, on the other. Although less frequently than the Jewish Question, Ukrainian nationalist propaganda also addressed the Gypsy Question. For example, the leaflets addressed by OUN to the Red Army soldiers warned the latter not to fight “along with Jews, Gypsies, and other scum.” On the basis of the Romani survivor’s testimonies, Bessonov has summarized the current perception of the OUN by the Roma as the epitome of robbery, war crimes, and mass murder. The Roma collective memory draws a stark distinction between Ukrainian nationalists and Soviet partisans: “While the Soviet partisans were perceived as brothers, and the Roma recall ‘good Germans’ even among the occupiers, no kind word was reserved for Stepan Bandera’s followers. ... For the Roma, they were bandits that destroyed peaceful population, that is, the Poles, the Jews, the Russians, and, of course, the itinerant Roma caravans. Cases that ended up in violence, insults, and battery are remembered by the former nomads as sheer luck (in the sense of escaping death, MT).” This is how Jerzy Flecowski summarized in 1949 the experiences of the Roma at the hands of the Ukrainian nationalists in Volyn. As for the OUN, presumably, it might believe that itinerant Roma were providing the enemy, be it Russians or Germans, with intelligence information. However, the shift in ideological and organizational principles of OUN and UPA in 1943 apparently changed their attitude toward the Roma for better.

The German sources have little to say as to the role of local administration and the auxiliary police in the persecution of the Roma; most information comes from the Soviet military authorities. Equally valuable are the records of local municipalities and village councils, which were involved in registration of Roma, as well as in accounting of the property following their execution—as they did with regard to the Jews. In March 1942, the mayor of Staryi Krym, Konstantin Artsikhevskaia, compiled a list of the twenty Roma living in the city and its vicinity. He later testified that he had forwarded the list to the gendarmerie. The list served as a basis for subsequent arrest of the Roma by the German police, which had taken the victims to Feodosia for mass execution. The Germans used auxiliary policemen for assembling, convoys, and occasionally executing the Roma, as it happened, for example, in the village of Kalanchak in Kherson province. On 8 May 1942 (possibly in June 1942) two German gendarmes, the district police chief, and his deputy arrived in Kalanchak. They ordered the local policemen
by names, ethnic Russians and/or Ukrainians) to assemble the Roma who it had been announced would be deported to Skadovsk. It is worth noting that all the Roma were sedentary, employed on a local collective farm. When the horse carts with the Roma and the accompanying police car reached the fruit gardens of the “Krasnyy partizan” collective farm less than a mile from the village, the Roma were ordered to get off the carts and then led to an antitank ditch. According to the postwar interrogation of one of the policemen, some of the latter’s colleagues were sent back to the district police, while the two Germans—assisted by the district police chief and the two remained policemen—killed the Roma, among them five children, six women, and two elderly.

In March 1942, the German gendarmerie in the village of Abakly-Toma in Dzhankoi district ordered the headman of the rural council, his deputy, and the clerk to compile a list of the sixty Roma who lived in the village. On 28 March, when a gas van arrived in the village, these local officials helped collect the Roma and load them into a truck. The postwar Soviet investigation established that the Roma were killed and their corpses tossed out into the open in the northeastern section of Dzhankoi. In the neighboring village of Burlak-Toma, the forty-five Romani residents were likewise assembled and loaded into the “gas chamber on wheels” with the assistance of the local headman and two local policemen. Once again, these Roma were sedentary and thus familiar to the local population. According to one of the witnesses: “The Roma were native residents of Burlak-Toma village; before the war they were members of our collective farm and they were good workers. The gassed Gypsies included old people and members of the Communist Youth League.”

After the war, the former policemen and village headmen mentioned above claimed that they had not known the purpose of the registration or the gas vans—or the plans of the Germans in general. There may have been some truth to these claims. The local collaborators often wanted to get rid of the Roma so that they could get hold of the victims’ property. In all likelihood, they did not bother thinking of the Roma’s fate. One can only speculate what would they have done if they had known what lay in store for those whose names were on the registration lists that they presented to the German authorities. One way or another, when the Roma were carried off, the headmen and the police aptly misappropriated the victims’ meager possessions, including pants, a summer dress, a mattress, a record player, a suit, and slippers. One local official testified: “Of the grain that was left over from the gassed Gypsies I swapped ca. 440 pounds of wheat for sixty eggs, and in exchange for a four-month-old pig and the sixty eggs I got from the Germans one cow

that had belonged to these same Gypsies.” Roma who lived in villages throughout the Dzhankoi district survived supposedly because the local headmen did not provide information about “their” Roma to the German administration, listing them as Tatars instead. As for a possible explanation, the rural administration might indeed consider these Roma to be Tatars—owing to their religious-cultural kinship—or perhaps the village chiefs did deliberately fool the Germans knowing full well what would about to happen to these Roma.

Relatives of the dead reflected on the question of the victims’ ethnic identification. In their postwar depositions to Soviet Security Police, they sometimes identified themselves and their deceased relatives as Crimean Tatars, claiming that the village headmen had handed the latter over to the Germans as “Gypsy Tatars.” Thus one witness testified that “in March 1942, during the German occupation of our district, a part of the Tatar population numbering forty-five persons was assembled by local headman Krivoruchko under the designation of ‘Gypsy Tatars,’ even though they were all workers and poor peasants and belonged to the native, Tatar, population. I witnessed how the Germans put everyone under arrest in chief Krivoruchko’s courtyard into the gas van that had just arrived.” Obviously, there was no consensus in society regarding the ethnic affiliation of the Roma. Some people, including the victims themselves, preferred to be considered Tatars, while others, including a portion of the Crimean Tatar population, were in no hurry to accept the Roma as “their own.” This ambivalence, which did not play a substantial role in peacetime, played a crucial role under conditions of German occupation when group membership became a matter of life and death. In view of the assistance provided to the Roma in the Crimea by Muslim Committees, local communities obviously could influence, if only to a smaller extent, Nazi policy. According to existing testimonies, some Tatars in Odessa also rescued those of their Romani neighbors who practiced Islam. Nonetheless, the instances of rescue remained few and far between.

Although the “Gypsy Question” never occupied a central part in the Nazi ideology, it nevertheless became a subject of a few newspaper articles published in the occupied Ukraine. For example, on 5 September 1943, the Kharkiv newspaper Nova Ukraina published an article under the title “The Gypsies and Europe.” The article claimed: “The Gypsy problem has unveiled the site of profound degeneration... Germans, in cooperation with the police, radically resolved the Gypsy question.... During a few thousand years of their coexistence with the civilized nations, the Gypsies have not embraced a settled way of life and remained the primordial nomadic barbarians.... The new Europe that arises from
that the differentiation between the itinerant and sedentary Roma ex-Ukraine, this chapter attempted to determine if different from that of the Jews. Like the Jews, the Roma were subjected to annihilation based solely on their ethnicity. Martin Holler supports this view, though only within the context of the territories under direct military rule. 114 All three scholars acknowledge differences in the treatment of the...
ties committed against the Roma were undocumented—the question remains whether one can speak of a program of total extermination.

The structure of this chapter, built in accordance with administrative rather than chronological structures, imposes further limitations for analysis. The mere fact that RKU reached its maximum expanse only by September 1942 makes it difficult for the historian to know exactly which particular German agency supervised what area, who committed the acts of mass murder, when the atrocity took place, and what was the number of victims. Nevertheless, it is safe to conclude that numerous instances of mass murder in the RKU apparently were committed when any given area was still under military rule. Furthermore, even when civilian administration took over power in that particular area, they did not, as a rule, play a leading role in policymaking dealing specifically with security issues (as the case study of Crimea has demonstrated).118

The known cases of the civil administration using Romani slave labor (no doubt, many Roma died of exhaustion and/or due to mistreatment) further complicate the matter. The discourse advanced in this chapter pinpoints genocidal intent on the part of the Wehrmacht and the SS, but not necessarily other branches of the German occupation administration. Therefore, I would encourage scholars to make a better use of the documents from different levels of civil administration—RKU, commissar general office, and district commissar office—alongside ChGK records and German security police and military reports. Not least essential for the analysis are oral testimonies of the Romani survivors who provide invaluable information not only about particular cases of mass murder but also about their experiences in forced labor camps. Despite the potential difficulties of interpretation, the 150 or so witness accounts taped in the 1990s in Ukraine (this collection is currently deposited at the University of Southern California Shoah Foundation Institute),117 and the less voluminous but no less important archives of Ukrainian Romani organizations,116 constitute an extremely important source.

The total number of Romani victims remains as well a subject of dispute. Statistical data, difficult to obtain anyway, is problematic due to the absence of reliable figures for each of the Ukrainian provinces under German occupation. Evidently, it has to do with the itinerant or dominated Europe, the most reliable figure in my opinion was provided within current Romani organizations,118 constitute an extremely important source.

As far as the Nazi mass murder of Roma in Ukraine is concerned, the available sources allow only minimum generalization, making it virtually impossible to single out the factor that would stay true for all the provinces. Obviously, the final analysis should take into account several overlapping factors rather than one. Let me begin with chronological factor. Apparently, the Nazis lacked a clearly defined anti-Roma policy at the initial stage of the war against the Soviet Union. However, as the situation on the ground evolved, this policy underwent critical transformation, and consequently had different dimensions in different places (as illustrated by the discussions in the RMO and, correspondingly, in RKU and RKU). Next come the factors of geography and the nature of the occupation regime. The specific interests of a dominant occupation structure to a certain degree determined the preferred solution of the “Gypsy Question” (the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the Wehrmacht supported or took a direct part in the destruction of itinerant Roma, viewing them as “spies” and a potential threat to the hinterland). The third, interconnected, factor has to do with the specific circumstances that affected the process of persecution within a single geographical area or administrative unit such as the ongoing combat operations, the passing of certain military units through any given territory, or economic considerations (the first wave of mass murder was perpetrated by mobile killing squads of the German Security Police and SD, whereas the civil administration was mainly interested in exploiting Roma labor).

Notes

1. For most comprehensive publications in English and German dealing with the mass murder of Roma in Nazi-occupied Ukraine, if only in passing, see Donald Kenrick and Gratian Puxon, Gypsies under the Swastika (Hatfield, UK, 1995), published also in Russian translation as Tevyegn po dvoostki (Moscow, 2001); Michael Zimmermann, Rassenfrage und Genozid: Die nationalsozialistische "Losung der Zigeunerfrage" (Hamburg, 1995); Guenter Lewy, The Nazi Persecution of the Gypsies (Oxford, 2000). For more recent publications see Martin Holler, Der nationalsozialistische Völkerkrieg an den Roma in der Besetzten Sowjetunion (1941–1944) (Heidelberg, 2009); Martin Holler, "Like Jews?" The Nazi Persecution and Extermination of Soviet Roma Under the German Military Administration: A New Interpretation, Based on Soviet Sources," Dapnia: Studi in onomastica, 24 (2010): 137–76; Mikhail Tyaglyy, "Were the ‘Chinoge’ Victims of the Holocaust? The Nazi Policy toward the Crimean Roma," Holocaust and Genocide Studies 23, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 23–53. For Russian and Ukrainian-language publications see the special issue of Zhurnal iuchashchih: studii v Ukraine i evropii (Kiev, 8, no. 2 (2009) (also available online at: http://nivuv.gov.ua/portal/Bok_Hum/Gidindex.html).


8. In his 2 July 1941 directive to the heads of the SS and the police, Heydrich designated several groups of Soviet citizens as subject to execution: (1) officials of the Comintern; (2) top- and middle-level officials and radical lower-level officials of the Communist Party; (3) People’s Commissars; and (4) Jews in party and state employment, and other radical elements (saboteurs, propagandists, snipers, assassins, inciters, etc.). See Yitzhak Arad et al., ed., *The Einsatzgruppen Reports: Selections From the Dispatches of the Nazi Death Squads’ Campaigns Against the Jews* (New York, 1989), vii-x.


10. Order of the high command of infantry forces (the so-called Brauchitsch Decree) concerning the “objectives of the security police and the SS in the infantry units,” 28 April 1941, reprinted in *Trials of War Criminals*, vol. 10, 1242.


14. Lewy does not provide a reference (*Nazi Persecution of the Gypsies*, 125).


16. **Local district administration to village councils, 10 July 1942, State Archives of Riwne Oblast, R-57/1/12.**

17. Ibid. The entire correspondence is published in Mikhail Tyaglyy, “*Nakazuyu ... pere­slaty ... spysky taqiganiv*: Zbir organamy vlyati Raškakomissariatu Ukraina vidomostei pro romiv v lypni 1942 r.,” *Golokost i nachalnist: studii v Ukraini i sviti* 8, no. 1 (2011): 85-101.


25. Ibid., 15.


28. Ibid., 16.


31. Extracts from the ChSK statement in Stalino province, 30 October 1943, Yad Vashem Archives (hereafter: YVA), M357/914.


33. Extracts from the ChSK statement in Stalino province, 30 October 1943, GARF, 7021/722.


40. Ibid., 9; Kruglov, "Genocid taqigan v Ukraini," 102.


42. Kruglov, "Genocid taqigan Ukrainy," 70.

43. Holler, *Der nationalsozialistische Volkermord*, 77.

44. Bessonov, "Genocid Taqigan Ukrainy."


54. Kostopol district commissar (!? Lohnert to Brest-Lyatskev commissar general (?), 22 April 1942, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (hereafter: USHMM), RG 31.017 M. I am grateful to Wendy Lower for bringing this document to my attention.

55. Commission general of Volyn-Podilia (? Schoene to district commissars, 21 May 1942, USHMM, RG 31.017 M.

56. Final statement of the ChGK of Rivne province, 2 June 1944, GARF, 7021/7/44.


62. ChGK report for the Kiev province, 7 December 1943, GARF, 7021/6/521.


66. Kenrick and Puxon, Tsigan' pod svastikoi, 120.


69. Statement by the ChGK on the German occupation and Romanian atrocities in Krivozerski and Ostiabankski district of Odessa province, GARF, R-7021/69/90.

70. Kenrick and Puxon, Tsigan’ pod svastikoi, 124.


76. “Svedeniiia o chislennosti naseleniia Kryma po perepisi 1939 g.,” State Archives of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (hereafter: DAARK), R-137/9/14.


78. Testimony of Jakub Kurtilcarov taken for the ChGK in Evpatiia, 22 May 1944, GARF, 7021/9/33.

79. Testimony of Neiza Kermelina from Kamyn-Buran taken for the ChGK in Korch, 8 June 1944, GARF, 7021/9/38.

80. Records of ChGK in Dzhankois, 8 October 1944, GARF, 7021/9/193.

81. “Spravka o chislennosti naseleniia g. Sinferopol’na na 1 novembria 1941g.,” DAARK, R-1302/1/5/6; “Spravka Sostav naseleniia g. Sinferopol’ na pital’nostsi i rod­nomu izjyu po sostojaniiu na 1 janvaria 1942 g.,” DAARK, R-1302/1/5/7; “Spravka o chislenosti i sostave naseleniia Sinferopol’ na 1 janvaria 1943 g.,” DAARK, R-1302/1/9/2.

82. Trials of War Criminals, vol. 4, 582.

83. From the diary of Khrisman Lashkevich, Peredaite detiam nashim o nashei sud’be (Simferopol, 2002), 63.


85. Trials of War Criminals, vol. 4, 290.

86. Lashkevich, Peredaite detiam nashim, 82.


88. The Crimes was not the only region in which Muslim religious affiliation played a role in the survival of many Gypsies. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, thanks to the intervention of the Muslim clergy in 1941 and 1942, the Ustaša authorities did not include in the deportation the so-called white Gypsies—Muslims who were thoroughly assimilated and had gradually lost their language and customs. Two other local Romani groups, the Cheragu and the Karamuli, led an itinerant lifestyle and were assimilated to a lesser degree, and were therefore subject to deportation. Cf. Yeshayahu A. Jelinek, “Bosnia-Herzegovina at War: Relations Between Moslems and Non-Moslems,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 5, no. 3 (Winter 1990): 289; Mark Biondić, “Persecution of Roma-Sinti in Croatia, 1941-1945,” in Roma and Sinti: Under-Studied Victims of Nazism, symposium proceedings (Washington, DC, 2002), 36-8; Sevasti Trubeta, “ ‘Gypsiness,’ Racial Discourse and Persecution: Balkan Roma During the Second World War,” Nationalities Papers, 11, no. 4 (December 2005): 508-8.

89. Transcript of the interrogation of Vasilisa Genova, 7 June 1944, DAARK, R-1289/1/6.

90. Testimony of the Gypsy woman Asanova to the ChGK of the Staro-Krymskii district, 3 November 1944, GARF, 7021/1/9/34.

91. Records of ChGK in Dzhankoi, 8 October 1944, GARF, 7021/9/193.

92. Field Headquarters 810 to Army Group South in Evpatiia, 9 July 1942, YVA, O-51/66/1/12.


94. Testimony of Nikolai Bugal, Deportatsiiia malorosskoi Kryma. Dokumenty, fakti, kommentarii (Moscow, 2002), 114. However, not all of those who declared Roma identity were in fact Roma. Mine the deportation of Roma in 1944 was carried out apparently as a result
of an "error," some Crimean Tatars claimed to be Roma in order to be able to return to the Crimea.

98. Alexander Diukov, Viorotepennyi urag. OUN, UPA i reshenie "Evreiskogo voprosa" (Moscow, 2008), 58.
102. Minutes of interrogation of Pavel Borisov, 27 April 1944, ASBUARK, 18834.
103. Minutes of interrogation of Klimentii Plots, 22 May 1944, ASBUARK, 9775.
104. Minutes of interrogation of Pavel Borisov, 27 April 1944, ASBUARK, 18834.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
110. See Boris Kovaliev, Natsistskaia okkupatsiia i kollaborationizm v Rossii, 1941-1944 (Moscow, 2003), 375.
111. According to Christopher Browning, for example, the "German policies toward the 'Gypsies' outside the Third Reich, however murderous, did not constitute genocide" (Christopher Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942 [Lincoln, NE, 2004], 473). Guenter Lewy has argued that "the killing of the Gypsies of the Soviet Union was not part of any overall plan to exterminate all Gypsies" (Lewy, Nazi Persecution of the Gypsies, 128).
116. For the discord between civil authorities and the SS on policy issues see Wendy Lower, Nazi Empire Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine (Chapel Hill, NC, 2002), 126-28.
119. Kenrick and Puxon, Tsygane pod svastikoi, 103. Zimmermann does not provide any figures for the occupied Soviet territories, including Ukraine.